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Abstract 
The capability of a country's public sector to provide high-quality goods and services 
in a cost-effective way is crucial to fostering long-term growth. In this paper we study the 
determinants of public service efficiency (PSE) and in particular the role of citizens' political 
values. Indeed, we argue that citizens' willingness to invest time and effort monitoring public 
affairs is necessary if policy-makers are to be held accountable for what they do and deterred 
from wasting public resources. Contrary to other papers, our empirical analysis exploits 
within-country variation, therefore reducing the risk of omitted variable bias and implicitly 
controlling for differences in formal institutions. First, we compute PSE measures for several 
public services (namely education, civil justice, healthcare, childcare and waste disposal) for 
the 103 Italian provinces; then we show that a higher degree of political engagement 
increases PSE. This remains true even after controlling for the possible endogeneity of 
political culture. In our analysis, values specifically related to the political sphere are kept 
distinct from generically pro-social values. Our results suggest that the latter have no 
independent impact on PSE. 
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* Bank of Italy, Structural Economic Analysis Department.    1 Introduction1
The capability of a country’s public sector to provide high-quality goods and services in a cost-
e￿ective way is crucial to foster long-term growth. It’s up to politicians and bureaucrats to set
rules and practices which increase e￿ciency and reduce slack, delivering the highest possible value
for money to taxpayers.
The literature on political economy and public choice stresses that one cannot take for granted
that public decision-makers will always use public resources in the most appropriate way. The rela-
tionship between citizens and politicians is to some extent similar to a principal-agent relationship,
which creates risks of opportunistic behaviour and moral hazard.2
As we cannot have unquestioning faith in the honesty and competence of public decision-makers,
there is the need for well-designed formal rules for the political and administrative system: electoral
rules, term limits, checks and balances, etc.
However, citizens’ willingness to invest time and e￿ort monitoring public a￿airs is also necessary
if policy-makers are to be held accountable for what they do and deterred from wasting public
resources. This in turn requires both a shared set of values which go beyond narrow self-interest
and, in particular, a widespread concern for public a￿airs. Indeed, there is a well-known free-riding
problem inherent in the political sphere: the impact of a single individual on outcomes is negligible,
whereas mobilizing for elections and other political activities redirects time and resources from the
care of one’s private a￿airs, and can be quite costly.
The ￿rst and foremost goal of this paper is to assess empirically the importance of citizens’
political engagement for public sector e￿ciency (PSE). To this aim, we ￿rst compute measures of
e￿ciency for several public services (namely childcare, education, healthcare, civil justice and waste
disposal), for the 103 Italian provinces, Then we relate these PSE indicators to the propensity to
be politically active. Looking at within-country di￿erences, our approach implicitly controls for
di￿erences in formal institutions, and limits omitted variable bias. As we document in the ￿rst
part of the paper, we are helped by the fact that there are big di￿erences in PSE across Italy’s
regions and provinces, despite 150 years elapsing since the political and administrative uni￿cation
of the country.
Measuring people’s values is obviously problematic, but we rely on proxies used in several
previous studies. Besides measurement problems, however, there is the concern that the degree
of political engagement may be endogenous. This is a common problem with any attempt to use
values to explain political or economic outcomes (Guiso et al. 2006). We would ideally like to
capture only the e￿ects of the truly exogenous component of values, which is really part of the
1The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily re￿ect those of the Bank of
Italy. We are grateful, without implications, to Massimo Bordignon, Piero Cipollone, Silvia Giacomelli, Cristina
Giorgiantonio, Veronica Grembi, Luigi Guiso, Giovanna Messina and Marzia Romanelli for data and advice. Special
thanks go to Marco Casiraghi, who provided PSE estimates for a previous version of the paper. We also thank seminar
participants at the Bank of Italy, the European Commission (DG ECFIN), the Annual Meeting of the European
Public Choice Society, the 8th Journ￿ ees Louis-Andr￿ e G￿ erard-Varet, the Annual Meeting of the European Economic
Association, the XXI SIEP Conference and the Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association for
useful comments and suggestions.
2The literature on the agency relationship between citizens and politicians is thoroughly surveyed by Besley (2006).
Of course, by focusing on this relationship we do not mean to downplay the other con￿icts that shape political life, in
particular that between groups of citizens with con￿icting goals and values. However, in a context in which e￿ciency
is the main dependent variable, the latter problem seems less pressing: even if people disagree about the size and the
composition of public sector activities, they should all agree on the fact that public resources should not be wasted.
5society’s cultural heritage, that is \those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious and
social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation" (Guiso et al., 2006).3 In
order to address the endogeneity of political values (as well as measurement error) we instrument
them with two sets of variables: measures of political and social participation in early 20th century
Italy (from Nuzzo, 2006), and features of formal political institutions in place in the 14th century
(from de Blasio and Nuzzo, 2006). Indeed, while Italy is still quite homogenenous ethnically and in
terms of religion, the Italian regions are deeply di￿erent with respect to their century-long political
history, and there is a vast literature arguing that Italy’s ancient vicissitudes still partly shape its
contemporary political life (Putnam, 1993).
Our paper relates to a growing body of literature assessing the e￿ects of culture on government
performance. The seminal papers on this issue are Knack and Keefer (1997) and La Porta et al.
(1997).4 Both studies use a cross section of about 40 countries, and take indicators of trust and
civicness from the World Value Survey. However, drawing inferences from cross-country data is
problematic, due to the high number of possibly relevant variables. Moreover, as pointed out by
Guiso et al. (2006), these early contributions did not control for the endogeneity of trust. Our
paper is more closely related to Knack (2002), which uses data from US states (and controls for
possible endogeneity). Our approach di￿ers from his because we use objective e￿ciency indicators
as our dependent variable instead of perceived quality. We believe this is appropriate given that
expectations concerning government performance might be unreliable: individuals in areas in which
short-sighted sel￿shness and distrust are widespread, and governments consistently under-perform,
will probably expect less from their politicians and public o￿cials. Objective measures analogous
to ours have recently been computed for a cross-section of countries by international organizations,
such as the OECD (Hakkinen and Joumard, 2007, Sutherland et al, 2007), the IMF (Verhoeven et
al. 2007) and the European Commission (European Commission, 2008).5A paper in many respects
similar ro ours is the one by Borge et al. (2008) . The authors build an aggregate objective index of
public sector e￿ciency for almost 400 Norwegian provinces, for the years 2001-2005, encompassing
six service sectors (elderly care, primary and lower secondary education, daycare, welfare bene￿ts,
child custody and primary healthcare). The index is a simple ratio of a performance indicator
(expressed in relation to the sample mean) and the amount of available ￿scal resources. They
relate this index to local government revenues and to local political characteristics such as party
fragmentation, the left-wing majority, voter turnout, and top-down vs bottom-up budgetary proce-
dures. They ￿nd in particular that more cohesive government and stronger democratic participation
increase e￿ciency but do not address the issue of endogeneity.
More generally, our paper aims to contribute to the broader debate on the impact of cultural
traits on economic outcomes (Tabellini, 2008a, 2010). With respect to this literature, we try to
keep distinct generically pro-social values (so-called \generalized morality") from values inherent
3This is actually the de￿nition of culture that we adopt in this paper. Furthermore, we follow the political science
literature and call "political culture" that particular subset of beliefs and values speci￿cally related to the political
sphere: views about how the political system should function and beliefs about the ways it actually functions, views
about how people should behave in the political sphere and beliefs about they actually behave. In the paper we focus
on a crucial item in any political culture, namely the extent to which citizens feel a moral obligation to participate
to political life. We refer to this sense of obligation indi￿erently as "political engagement", "interest in politics", or
"propensity to participate".
4See also La Porta et al. (1999).
5See also OECD (2008) and Afonso et al. (2005). Within-country studies are also frequent. Afonso and Scaglioni
(2007) provide e￿ciency measures for Italy at the Region level.
6to the political sphere. We adhere to the idea, well-established in political science at least since
Almond and Verba (1963), that political values (and more generally political culture), should be
distinguished by morals. For example, it may well be possible that in recent decades there has
been an increase in people’s willingness to participate in pro-social activities (e.g. volunteering for
NGOs) together with a growing disillusion and detachment from politics (Inglehart, 1977).6As we
will argue below, at least in the in the case of Italy, it seems that political participation is much
more relevant than generalized morality per se in explaining di￿erences in PSE.7
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in the second section we compute and discuss our
measures of PSE for ￿ve public services; in the third section we present and justify our baseline
econometric exercise; in section 4 we report the results; section 5 discusses the role of decentraliza-
tion in service provision; and section 6 concludes.
2 Public sector e￿ciency in the Italian provinces
2.1 De￿ning (in)e￿ciency
There are several well-established de￿nitions of (in)e￿ciency of a production unit (be it an industrial
plant, a ￿rm or a public entity) in the microeconomic literature (see e.g. Fried et al. 2008). In
this paper we use concepts of technical e￿ciency, all of which boil down to a comparison between
actual and potential performance. More formally, suppose that several production units produce a
certain (vector of ) output y with a certain (vector of) input x, where T is the set of all technically
possible input-output combinations. De￿ne:
L(y) = fxj(x;y) 2 Tg
P(x) = fyj(x;y) 2 Tg
F(x) = Maxfyjy 2 P(x)g
Then a natural measure of ine￿ciency for a production unit i, which produces output yi with
input xi, is:
IneffOUT
i = Maxf￿ 2 R+jyi￿ 2 P(xi)g:
Basically, it de￿nes ine￿ciency as the ratio between potential (given technology and inputs)
and actual performance. In turn, the inverse of IneffOUT







Another widely used measure is provided by:
EffINP
i = Minf￿ 2 R+jxi￿ 2 L(yi)g:
6In the same vein, people in a community might have a high degree of interpersonal trust, but be sceptical about
the possibility of e￿ectively in￿uencing public policies.
7Of course, pro-social values can also have a positive indirect in￿uence on public service e￿ciency, if they increase
political engagement (for example raising the likelihood of having honest politicians).
7It measures how much less input unit i could use to produce the level of output it actually
produces.8IneffOUT
i and EffINP
i are also referred to, respectively, as output-oriented and input-
oriented Debreu-Farrell indices, while EffOUT
i is known as the Shephard index.9
In the rest of the paper, unless otherwise stated, we focus on EffOUT
i as our preferred de￿nition
of e￿ciency. We check that our results do not change with di￿erent de￿nitions of e￿ciency.
2.2 Estimating the frontier
Whatever the de￿nition of e￿ciency adopted, the main problem encountered in measuring e￿-
ciency is how to ￿nd out the production frontier. In practice e￿cient performances are de￿ned as
un-dominated performances, i.e. performances located on the \best practice frontier". To construct
this frontier from the observed input-output pairs (xi;yi), two approaches have been used in the lit-
erature: the parametric and the non-parametric approaches. The advantage of the non-parametric
approach is of course that it does not require the speci￿cation of a functional form, so that it avoids
the risk of confusing the e￿ects of misspeci￿cation of the functional form with those of ine￿ciency.
The basic idea underlying non parametric methods is quite simple. Given our sample of production
units (xi;yi), we use this sample to deduce the production possibility set T. Once we have this








F0(x) = Maxfyjy 2 P0(x)g:
Non-parametric methods di￿er in how they build T0. Our baseline measure of the e￿ciency of
public spending in the Italian provinces is constructed applying a commonly used non-parametric
method, called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). In the DEA approach, T0 is identi￿ed as the
intersection of all the production sets which satisfy the following list of assumptions: (1) all the
(xi;yi) belong to the set; (2) free disposability; (3) convexity; (4) a strictly positive amount of
input is needed to produce a strictly positive amount of output.10 In practice, the various e￿ciency
indexes in a non-parametric setting are computed solving linear programming problems.11
8In the presence of constant return to scale the two scores coincide.
9As Ineff
OUT
i takes values between 1 and +1, Eff
OUT
i takes values in (0,1). When we use e￿ciency as the
dependent variable in our econometric exercises, we actually use the ratio of Eff
OUT
i to the average level.
10Another non-parametric approach that can be used to assess productive e￿ciency is the FDH (Free Disposal
Hull) technique. The main di￿erence between the two methodologies is that in the FDH assumption 1 (convexity) is
dropped. The DEA e￿ciency frontier always encompasses the FDH frontier, so that some units which are e￿cient
according to the FDH method are instead ine￿cient according the DEA technique (see Tanassoulis et al. 2008 for
further details).





















i is instead computed as:
8Moreover, to check further the robustness of our results, we also use parametric tecniques. In
particular, we follow most of the literature by assuming a log-linear relationship:
lnyi = ￿0 + ￿1lnxi + ui:
We ￿rst assume that ui ￿ 0 (known as the \deterministic approach"). As a further exercise, we
also make the alternative assumption that the error term is decomposable into a truly ine￿ciency
component and a random error:
ui = u1i + u2i
where u1i ￿ 0 is half-normal and u2i is a standard normal error term (the \stochastic approach").12
In both cases, the frontier is then given by the function:
lny = ^ ￿0 + ^ ￿1lnx:
2.3 Input and output measures for the Italian public sector
In assessing the e￿ciency of the public sector in the 103 Italian provinces we focus on ￿ve spending
categories. Two of them are the responsibility of the central government (the judiciary and edu-
cation); one is within the remit of the regional governments (health); the remaining two (childcare
and waste collection) are administered by the local governments.13 Depending on the sector, we
consider averages over a given period of time (assuming that it takes time for public intervention
to in￿uence outcomes) or the most recent year for which data are available (when we have more
straightforward output measures). In what follows we provide information about how we measure
inputs and outputs for each of the ￿ve spending categories and our data sources.
Health { We use as input per capita public health expenditure adjusted for the age structure
of the population. We take averages over the years 1985-2007. Our computation is based on o￿cial
expenditure and population statistics, and on coe￿cients provided by the Ministry of Health to
compute the equivalent population (intuitively, these coe￿cients correct for the fact that health
expenditure is concentrated in particular age-groups, so that regions with a higher share of elderly
people tend to have higher per capita spending). All these data refer to the 20 Italian regions.
Given the lack of province-level data, we assume here that our input measure does not vary across

















In both expressions the last constraint implies variable returns to scale (non-increasing returns to scale if it holds
with ￿). Dropping this constraint amounts to assuming a production function with constant returns to scale. In our
baseline calculation, we assume non-increasing returns to scale. We also provide PSE estimates in which constant
returns to scale are assumed.
12To implement the deterministic approach we performed the two-step procedure called Corrected Ordinary Least
Squares, which delivers consistent estimates of the parameters ￿0 and ￿1 (Greene, 2008). To implement the stochastic
approach we resorted to ML techniques, which again ensure consistency of ^ ￿0 and ^ ￿1 .
13Besides the Provinces and the State, the other administrative units in Italy are the 20 Regions and the approxi-
mately 8100 municipalities.
9between the years 1981-1983 and 2003-2005 (as customary, we use averages to reduce the in￿uence
of temporary and exceptional events on mortality rates, such as particularly cold winters). We take
variations in life expectancy instead of levels to at least partially control for environmental factors
which in￿uence outcomes independently of public healthcare. Data for each province from 1992
onward are available from Istat (the National Institute of Statistics); for the previous years, we use
data from Lipsi and Caselli (2002), who compute mortality tables for the Italian provinces in the
years 1971-73, 1981-83, 1991-93. We also experiment with the inclusion of a second input, namely
GDP growth over the period considered, to take into account the fact that a better standard of
living can have a positive in￿uence on behaviour and ultimately on health outcomes: it turns out
that di￿erences between the two e￿ciency measures are negligible (correlation between them is
equal to 0.94).
Education { Our input measure is the number of teachers per pupil in the primary and ￿rst
three years of secondary school (school year 2005-06). These data are published for each province
by the Ministry of Education. Basing our calculations on teachers instead of on spending, for
which we do not have province-level data, should not a￿ect our results. In fact, about 97% of
education expenditure in Italy is accounted for by compensation of employees. As a measure of
output, we use the performance of 6th and 9th grade students in tests carried out by INValSI
(the public institute in charge of evaluating the Italian educational system) during the school year
2005-06.14 Performance is measured by the average score (i.e. the percentage of correct answers
in a multiple choice questionnaire) obtained in the Italian, Maths and Science tests. In contrast to
evaluation exercises carried out by international institutions (e.g. OECD-PISA, TIMSS, PIRLS),
whose sample of pupils cannot be used for our purposes as it is not representative at the province
level, INValSI evaluations encompass a much larger number of schools. Actually, for the 6th grade
basically all the schools have been tested, while for the 9th grade we have access to a very large
representative sample.15 We also computed an alternative e￿ciency index, including as a second
input the average educational attainment of adults in the province, to take into account the fact
that parents’ educational background may have an impact on child attainment; results are however
very similar under both speci￿cations (the correlation between the two measures of e￿ciency is
equal to 0.96).
14In a very interesting study, Cipollone et al. (2010) use the scores for the 9th and the 11th grades. Instead of
taking, as we do, the averages of the two measures, they consider the di￿erences between the two scores which they
interpret as the "value-added" indicators of the school (even if they use only the 2005-2006 cross section, as we do).
We believe that the two papers nicely complement each other. As a general method to allow for the possibility
that di￿erent starting points have an impact on the performance of the school system as a whole, the Cipollone et
al. (2010) idea of using for individual-level longitudinal data a method that has previously been applied to class-
level cross-section data seems promising. However, we preferred to address this issue in a more traditional way (see
Sutherland et al. 2007 and, with special reference to Italy, Boarini, 2009 and OECD, 2009), i.e. trying to control for
the educational background of adults (see below). Interestingly, we ￿nd a quite similar geographical gradient as in
Cipollone et al. (2010).
15The 2005-2006 survey is the last one for which a census approach as been followed. Afterwards, INValSI surveyed
only a sample of schools. Although on average the results reported by INValSI do not di￿er substantially from those
of other international tests, the outcomes in the South, particularly those obtained in primary schools, seem more
favourable than those resulting from other evaluation exercises. Some observers argue that this might be due to some
cheating by teachers administering the test in the Southern area. While we are unable to correct for this potential
problem - INValSI has indeed recently devised a procedure that corrects for the possibility of cheating, but these data
are available only for a small sample of schools and so cannot be used for our purposes - the existence of cheating in
the South would imply an even steeper north-south gradient in e￿ciency, and therefore would strengthen our results.
10Civil Justice { We take the number of judges per 1,000 new trials in 2006 as our input. Two
remarks are in order about this measure. First, lower-level court districts in Italy do not perfectly
overlap with provinces (there are 103 provinces and 165 tribunali16), so we restrict ourselves to the
judges working in the main court (tribunale) of the province (typically located in the main city,
even if it there are sometimes other subsidiaries inside the province, which we consider as well).
Second, in many districts it is not clear how many judges work in the civil sector, and how many
in the criminal sector. We use estimates of this ratio, computed using the available data.17 Our
measure for output in the civil justice sector is the average length of trials in 2006, as estimated by
Istat.
childcare { Our input is expenditure for child daycare provided by municipalities in 2007 (we
only consider the capital of the province). Our output is given by the number of children in daycare
in 2007. Data come from the Ministry of the Interior (Certi￿cati di conto consuntivo dei comuni).
As a robustness check, we added as a second output the best avaliable proxy for the quality of
the service, that is the number of nurses available for each child: while this reduces the number
of observations (as the information is only available for a subset of provinces) results are basically
unchanged (correlation between the quality-adjusted and the unadjusted measure is 0.95).
Waste Collection { We take as our input the amount of expenditure for waste collection.
We consider separately two outputs, namely tons of wastecollected and recycled and tons of waste
simply taken to waste disposal sites or incinerated. This distinction is necessary as the ￿rst process
has of course much higher unit costs, so using the average amount of waste disposal as a single
output would certainly be misleading. For both input and outputs we use o￿cial data from the
Government’s Enviromental Protection Agency (APAT, Rapporto ri￿uti 2006).
2.4 The map of public sector e￿ciency in Italy
In Table 1 we report regional averages of public sector output indicators for each of the ￿ve spending
items. In the last column we also report a summary measure of regional public sector output,
obtained as a simple average of the indicators in each spending area. The indicators show notable
di￿erences across Italian regions. In all service categories, regions in the South exhibit the lowest
output level. Overall, public sector output in the South is 74 per cent of the Italian average. The
gap is higher for services supplied by municipalities (childcare and waste collection).
A similar picture emerges if we look at PSE. In Table 2 we report our baseline measures of
e￿ciency. Again, average public sector e￿ciency in the South is about 10% below the Italian
average. Geographical di￿erences in e￿ciency are generally more pronounced in the sectors where
the service is delivered by municipal authorities: the standard deviation-to-mean ratio ranges
between 0.53 (childcare) and 0.08 (education). Interestingly, however, the dispersion in judicial
e￿ciency scores is quite high as well (0.45), mainly due to the high e￿ciency of courts in the North-
west (particularly, in Piemonte). Overall, the correlation between e￿ciency scores in di￿erent public
services is not strong (Table 3).
Finally, we compare our baseline measure of average public sector e￿ciency with other indices,
obtained by using di￿erent de￿nitions of e￿ciency and frontier estimation methodologies (Table
16Lower-level court districts (circondari di tribunali) are in turn grouped into 29 higher-level districts (distretti di
corte d’appello).
17We are grateful to our colleague C. Giorgiantonio for providing us with these ￿gures, based on data from the
Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura website.
114). The results just described for the baseline measure seem extremely robust. In particular, the
correlation coe￿cient between the output-oriented DEA-based e￿ciency measures and the values
obtained by estimating the frontier by means of the parametric approach is 0.91 for the deterministic
case and 0.68 for the stochastic case (Table 5).
3 The determinants of public sector e￿ciency
What determines the e￿ciency of a public service? Our hypothesis is that strong oversight of
citizens and users is crucial in keeping politicians accountable. However, political participation has
the nature of a public good: all citizens bene￿t from it in a non-rival, non-excludable way. This is
true even for the most basic form of political participation, i.e. the act of voting: as highlighted
by the literature on the so-called voting paradox, for narrowly self-interested citizens the costs of
going to vote are likely to outweigh the expected bene￿ts. This is even more true for other more
resource-consuming forms of political participation, such as ￿nding out about politics or actively
collaborating with others in an e￿ort to in￿uence political decisions.18 A political culture in which
political engagement is a highly-considered value must provide for politicians’ oversight.19
In what follows we ￿rst provide a very simple model in which these ideas are spelled out more
formally. Then we move from theory to data, describing our preferred measure of preferences for
political participation.
3.1 A simple framework
We propose a straightforward extension of the retrospective voting model of Barro (1973) and
Ferejohn (1986). In this model, the only relevant dimension of political con￿ict is the agency
relationship between citizens and the political decisionmaker. In particular, there is no con￿ict of
interests among citizens (who are assumed to behave in a coordinated manner), and there are no
di￿erences in competence or talent between politicians (so the problem is one of moral hazard).
A politician (e.g. the prime minister, a regional governor, a mayor) is in charge of providing a
service s in a certain province p. He can either provide the service in an e￿cient way, by exerting
an e￿ort which costs him C in utility terms, or he can shirk, and provide the service ine￿ciently,
but at no cost to himself. However, shirking may have a cost for him on election day, when he runs
against an opponent. Suppose that a fraction q of citizens knows that he has shirked. In line with
the literature on retrospective voting we assume that the citizens will punish this candidate and
vote for his opponent. The uninformed voters will instead randomize between the two candidates.
If there are no relevant di￿erences between candidates, this voting rule is (weakly) individually
rational. Let the incumbent utility be increasing in the fraction of votes received in the province















18On the di￿erent channels of political participation, an authoritative reference is Verba et al. (1995).
19Needless to say, this is a recurring theme in political science and political theory (see e.g. Almond, 1978).
12if not. Therefore, the politician will behave if and only if q > q￿, where q￿ is de￿ned as the unique












Ex ante, citizens can decide whether to acquire information about the actions of the politician.
In particular, suppose that they can see whether the politician shirks or not at a cost cs. If the
politician does not shirk, and the public service is provided e￿ciently, each citizen will get a higher
level of utility (say, uh) than if the politician shirks (say ul). However, from a purely self-interested
point of view, of course, no citizen will ￿nd it optimal to acquire information, because it is clear
that the impact of one vote at the electoral stage will be negligible. As it is often done in the
literature on turnout, we assume that the overall utility of citizens does not only depend on the
e￿ciency of the public service, but since citizens also have a sense of duty, they get utility from the
very act of ￿nding out about politics.21 In particular, the utility of citizen i is set equal to:
u ￿ Xi(cs ￿ vi);
where u = uh if the politician behaves and u = ul if the politician shirks, vi represents the \psychic
gains" that individual i gets from participating in politics, Xi is an indicator that is equal to 1
if the citizen acquires information and zero otherwise. Moreover, we assume that in the province
p vi is distributed in the population according to a uniform distribution with support [0;vp] (so
provinces with higher vp have a higher degree of civicness). Thus the the fraction of people that
acquire information about service s in province p is equal to min[0,1 ￿ cs=vp], and this in turn





In words, service s in province p will be provided e￿ciently if cs is su￿ciently low, and/or if vp
is su￿ciently high (i.e. if the province is su￿ciently imbued with civic values).
One can easily extend the basic framework to take into account another element that is con-
sidered relevant to determine PSE levels, namely the quality of politicians (Besley, 2006). While
in our basic framework all politicians are purely self-interested, one could introduce a fraction of
\good-spirited" politicians who always behave honestly, irrespectively of incentives. Let us set the
fraction of \good" politicians in province p equal to ￿p, let self-interested politicians di￿er with
respect to their level of C (which is continuously distributed according to a cumulative distribution
function FC (.)), and assume that the quality of the politicians is unobservable, so that an adverse
selection component is added to that of moral hazard. In such a framework, the incentives of self-
interested politicians change, because behaving honestly now has the further bene￿t of improving
one’s reputation with the well-informed citizens. In particular, in equilibrium the informed citizens
20We assume that U(1) ￿ C > U(0), so that q* is between 0 and 1.
21This "consumption bene￿t" from voting was ￿rst introduced by Ricker and Ordeshook (1968) to address the
well-known "voter paradox" (the fact that people go to the polls even if the probability for any one of them to be
pivotal is negligible). In the literature, several other explanations of the "paradox" have been advanced (for a survey,
see Feddersen, 2004). Up to now there seems to be a consensus that voters are indeed motivated to vote by a sense
of duty and that it varies sistematically across social groups (see Blais, 2000 for a review of the empirical evidence).
Of course, for our purposes we do not need to argue that this is the only or even the main motivation to vote.
13understand that the probability that the incumbent is good, given the latter exerts e￿ort, is:
￿p
￿p + (1 ￿ ￿p)FC(C￿)
> ￿p












and the probability of a high e￿ort is ￿p+(1￿￿p)FC(C￿), which is decreasing in cs
vp and increasing
in ￿p.22
3.2 Measuring interest in politics
It goes without saying that measuring cultural variables is bound to be di￿cult and controversial,
and political engagement is no exception. We try to capture the degree of political engagement
using two proxies borrowed from previous highly in￿uential work. First, we consider the number
of newspapers sold in the province (￿rst used by Putnam 1993; updated ￿gures for Italy are taken
from Cartocci, 2007) and turnout for referenda from 1946 to 1989 (as in Putnam 1993 and Guiso
et al. 2004).23 We use the simple average of the two indicators as our index of \interest in politics"
(intpol).Referendum turnout is a more accurate measure of participative attitudes than election
turnout, because patronage motivations are absent (we do not consider post-1989 referenda because,
given the existence of a minimum turnout threshold, in recent years abstention has been used by
those contrary to the referendum objective as a means to make it fail). We checked that results are
robust to the use of alternative measures. In particular we also built a more comprehensive index
using opinion data from the 2004 Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW),
concerning a representative sample of the Italian population (Banca d’Italia, 2006). In a special
section of the 2004 wave a subgroup of the sample (about 10,000 respondents) was asked: \How
interested are you in politics?". Four answers (Very, fairly, not very, not at all) were possible. We
used answers to this question (averaged at the province-level), together with newspaper circulation
￿gures and referendum turnout to build a more comprehensive measure of interest in politics. The
results (available on request) are qualitatively and quantitatively analogous to those presented in
the paper.
To assess the role of \generalized morality" (morality) we use as a proxy the amount of blood
donations in the province, used among others by Guiso et al. (2004) and Nannicini et al. (2010).
For morality, as for intpol, we experimented with other proxies, and in particular we exploited
the fact that in the 2004 SHIW respondents were asked to what extent they deemed the following
three behaviours acceptable: a) not paying for one’s ticket on public transport: b) keeping money
obtained by accident when it would be possible to return it to the rightful owner (for example, if
you found a wallet with the owner’s name and address, or if you were given too much change at the
supermarket check-out); c) not leaving your name for the owner of a car you accidentally scraped
22Here we make the standard assumption that the informed voters compare the incumbent’s reputation with the
reputation of an outsider chosen at random from the population, so they vote for the incumbent as long as his
reputation is better.
23The importance of the press for political accountability is stressed, among others, by Snyder and Stromberg
(2010).
14while parking. Using answers to these questions (province averages) together with blood donations
as an alternative index of generalized morality did not change our results.
Table 6 displays region averages for our baseline intpol (together with its sub-indices) and
morality measures, all showing as expexted that the Southern part of the country lags behind with
respect to both indicators.
4 Empirical analysis
In our theoretical framework, the degree of citizens’ concerns for public a￿airs has an impact on
e￿ciency (due to the pressure that vigilant citizens put on politicians). In our empirical analysis
we capture this link estimating the following equation:
Effp = ￿0 + ￿1intpolp + ￿2Xp + ￿p; (1)
where Effp stands for PSE in province p (expressed as a ratio of its sector-speci￿c mean); intpolp
is our \interest in politics" indicator, and Xp is a vector of controls. In our baseline speci￿cation,
and unless otherwise stated, it consists of the province population and of a dummy for the Southern
provinces (the latter variable is meant to capture any other factor, besides political participation,
which could drive the north-south divide24): ￿1 is the parameter we are primarily interested in.
4.1 OLS estimation
As our point of departure, we estimate equation (1) by OLS, using average PSE as our dependent
variable: the impact of intpol is positive and signi￿cant at 1% con￿rming our hypothesis that
interest in politics has a positive impact on e￿ciency (Table 7a, column 1). As a robustness
exercise, we also show the results of regressions in which on the left-hand side are the ￿ve PSE
sub-indices (Table 7b; for all the ￿ve dependent variables, the set of controls is the same as in the
baseline regression). This helps to identify whether our result is driven by the way in which average
PSE is computed. Reassuringly, the coe￿cient on intpol is positive and signi￿cant in four out of
￿ve sectors (the exception being civil justice).
Our second step is to include morality among the regressors, which however turns out to be non
signi￿cant (Table 7a, column 2). This ￿nding suggests that pro-social values are important for PSE
only to the extent that they translate into higher political participation.25 It seems indeed that,
as remarked by Putnam, \citizens in the civic community are not required to be altruists", and
altruism is neither su￿cient nor necessary to participate in politics. Ine￿cient public action in the
less developed areas of Italy might have more to do with political apathy and discouragement, with
a sense of political ine￿ectiveness, than to the often quoted \amoral familism" (Ban￿eld, 1958).
24This is in the same vein as in Guiso et al. (2008), which focus on the e￿ects of di￿erent levels of social capital
within the North.
25As we remarked in the introduction, several political scientists (e.g. Inglehart 1977) tend to be sceptical about
the existence of such a direct link between the two set of values, at least in advanced post-industrial societies.
Interestingly, Almond and Powell (1963, chapter IX) noticed that in their dataset (coming from surveys conducted
in 5 Western nations) this link was particularly weak in the case of Italy.
154.2 Instrumental variables estimation
While it is plausible that preferences shape political and economic outcomes, one cannot take
for granted that preferences themselves are exogenous. Concerning our subject matter, there are
many reasons why current PSE may in￿uence current interest in politics. Low quality governments
may indeed breed discouragement and apathy with respect to politics in some citizens, instead of
pressure for change.
Ideally, we would like to capture the e￿ects of the truly exogenous components of political
values. To this aim, we resort to IV estimation.
First, we instrument intpol with measures of political engagement of earlier generations of
Italians, consistent with recent research which shows that several cultural traits are transmitted
across time from one generation to the next (Tabellini, 2008b). So we consider indices of political
and social participation in the early 20th century, given respectively by electoral turnout in the last
pre-fascism election and by the fraction of people participating in pro-social associations (both are
taken from Nuzzo, 2006).
A second complementary possibility is to argue that the degree of political engagement observed
in a community is due to past political institutions. Therefore, we also try to identify the exogenous
component of intpol using as instruments the features of formal political institutions in place in
the XIV century (taken from de Blasio and Nuzzo, 2006). The idea here is that while in the
medieval repubbliche civic liberties and political engagement were ￿ourishing, in the rest of the
Italian provinces institutional arrangements were characterized by weaker democracies and less
developed political life. In particular, de Blasio and Nuzzo (2006) identify four other kinds of
government, namely, the dictatorial signorie, the absolutist kingdom of the church (ponti￿cio), the
southern Regno delle due sicilie, and a residual group of provinces governed by foreign powers
(periferiche). The assumption is that even a short experience of democracy and participation in
the very distant past is able to shape citizens’ attitudes towards politics today (as in Guiso et al.,
2007), while it is unlikely to have had a direct impact on today’s PSE.
Results are shown in Table 8a (average PSE is the dependent variable). The ￿rst stage regres-
sions are quite encouraging: the ￿t is good and values of the F statistics are always well above the
thresholds usually required (Table 8b).
The second stage regressions con￿rm that political values matter in explaining PSE. Indeed,
the component of intpol explained by political history is again positive and signi￿cant at 1%, (the
coe￿cient is actually higher than in the OLS estimation, suggesting that instruments go some way
in solving measurement error problems for our independent variables). For both sets of instruments,
the Hansen test cannot reject the null that instruments are clean.
The economic signi￿cance of higher levels of civic engagement is non negligible: a 10% increase
of intpol from its average level implies an increase in PSE of more than 3%.
Our next step is to run the IV estimation adding morality as a further regressor. Even in this
case, intpol turns out to be strongly signi￿cant, whereas morality is not (Table 8a). This is true
even when morality is instrumented with the same set of instruments used to instrument intpol,
although our instruments seem weaker in this case (see Table 8b, last two columns: the R-square
and the F statistics are somewhat lower then in the other ￿rst stage regressions, especially when
we use the set of political history dummies).26
26In a way, the very fact that the historical roots of today’s generalized morality seem quite di￿erent from those of
today’s political culture lends weight to our argument that the two concepts should be kept distinct.
16As a ￿nal robustness exercise, we try to address the concern that our instruments, which
perform quite well in explaining today’s political participation, do not have a direct impact on PSE
today, making our IV strategy invalid. Of course, this possibility can never be ruled out or tested.
However, we try to relax our identi￿cation assumption including among the regressors (an estimate
of) the level of GDP per capita at the province level. These widely used data (the only ones
available for Italy) are provided by the Italian Chamber of Commerce, and are de￿nitely not free
from measurement errors. In any case, the results of our further empirical exercise are reassuring,
as even with the inclusion of GDP per capita among the regressors the (historically determined)
component of intpol remains signi￿cant (Table 8a and Table 8b).
5 Extension: the role of decentralization
Due to the institutional characteristics of the Italian public sector, our data-set can also shed
some light on a second possible determinant of PSE besides political culture, namely the degree of
centralization in public sector provision.
Indeed, the decentralization of service provision may a￿ect PSE through several channels (see
for example Treisman, 2002; Rodden, 2006; Lockwood, 2006, Oates, 2005). On the one hand, it is
often emphasized that local politicians are more easily monitored, so that (using the framework put
forward in the previous section) cs is lower if service s is provided by a lower level of government.
On the other hand, there might be diseconomies of scale in providing services in a decentralized
manner: C could be higher if the service is provided locally. This last point has an obvious impact
on incentives: as C is higher for the decentralized providers (let us assume that for each politician
the cost of e￿ort is increased by a quantity ￿C > 0 equal for all of them), q￿ and C￿ are higher as
well, so that the probability that self-interested politicians will behave in an honest way tends to
be lower. Finally, the bene￿ts from decentralization are likely to depend on the quality of the local
pool of politicians. Thus, decentralization is bene￿cial if and only if:
(￿p ￿ ￿mean)(1 ￿ FC(C￿dec)) + (1 ￿ ￿mean)(FC(C￿dec) ￿ FC(C￿cen)) > 0: (2)
which can be true or false depending on the parameters, and on the speci￿c characteristics of
the province considered. In particular, the ￿rst term is positive in areas in which the politicians
are more honest than average, and negative otherwise. The second term is positive if and only if
C￿dec > C￿cen27, i.e. if the increase in the bene￿ts stemming from honest behaviour due to stricter
oversight is higher than the increase in the cost of e￿ort, due to diseconomies of scale. To sum
up, whether on average decentralized service provision enhances e￿ciency remains an empirical
question.
Moreover, it is not even certain on a priori grounds whether the net bene￿ts of decentralization
increase with the degree of political engagement. Indeed, while this is true for (￿p ￿ ￿mean)(1 ￿
FC(C￿dec)), it can be easily shown that FC(C￿dec) ￿ FC(C￿dec) decreases as vp rises (intuitively,
the decrease in cs due to decentralization is less important in those provinces in which there is a
high level of vp: in these provinces, people monitor politicians’ behaviour in any case).






















17As the ￿ve public services that we study are delivered by di￿erent levels of government (the
central government provides education and administrates justice, regions provide healthcare, mu-
nicipalities provide child daycare and waste collection), our data-set allows us to shed some light on
the impact of decentralization on PSE. Indeed, we can relate our service-speci￿c measures of public
sector e￿ciency to decentralization in service provision. To this end, we use a pooled sample, in
which each sector-province data point is considered as a distinct observation. On this expanded
sample, we estimate our baseline speci￿cation, augmented by a dummy variable which is equal to
one if the service is provided at the municipal level and zero otherwise. It turns out that the e￿ect
of decentralization is statistically insigni￿cant (Table 9, column 1).
However, this result might conceal opposite e￿ects of decentralization on the lower and the
upper tails of the e￿ciency distribution. To detect such e￿ects, we perform quantile regressions.28
Results indicate that the e￿ect of decentralization is indeed signi￿cant and negative for the lower
quantiles (Table 9, columns 2 to 5). It becomes positive (and signi￿cant) in the upper part of the
e￿ciency distribution. That is, being managed by central or regional governments improves PSE in
areas where e￿ciency is low. In contrast, within the provinces where the average quality of public
services is higher, locally-provided services are more e￿cient than centrally-provided ones.
Needless to say this result is potentially of great policy relevance. As decentralization might
amplify di￿erences between regions, forms of \two-speed decentralization", where only the most
e￿cient regions are allowed to provide certain services, seem advisable.29
6 Conclusions
In this paper we build objective measures of PSE for the Italian provinces and show that they
positively depend on the citizens’ willingness to participate in politics. Using within-country data
allows us to control for di￿erences in formal rules, reduces omitted variable bias, and also gives us
the possibility to exploit the unique peculiarities of Italy’s extremely long and rich political history.
Indeed, it turns out that, as Putnam (1993) imagined, this history still has an impact on today’s
political life. We ￿nd that historically-determined political values still in￿uence the quality of the
Italian public sector. In particular, it seems con￿rmed that, whatever the level of government
involved, a well-functioning public sector requires active citizens, able and willing to monitor and
sanction ine￿cient politicians. As Putnam puts it: \citizens in civic communities expect better
government, and (in part through their own e￿ort) they get it [...] if decision makers expect citizens
to hold them politically accountable, they are more inclined to temper their worst impulses rather
than face the public protests". We also provide evidence which suggests that pro-social values per
se seem neither necessary nor su￿cient to have a well-functioning government. Finally, shifting our
focus from cultural to institutional variables, we ￿nd that service decentralization is something of
a mixed blessing: it is likely to bene￿t areas in which PSE is already strong, at the risk of further
depressing PSE in areas in which is already very low.
28Koenker and Hallok (2001) provide a very readable introduction to the literature on this technique, as well as a
comprehensive set of readings.
29A similar arrangement is in place in Spain, and has been proposed in Italy as well.
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Table 1. Public sector output indicators
Region (1) Health (2) Education (3) Judicial system (4) Daycare (5) Waste disposal (6) Average
Valle d'Aosta 1.04 1.06 1.35 1.20 1.13 1.16
Piemonte 1.01 1.06 1.95 1.07 1.18 1.25
Liguria 1.00 1.01 1.04 1.19 0.99 1.05
Lombardia 1.18 1.04 1.43 0.72 1.34 1.14
Trentino Alto Adige 1.21 0.98 1.52 1.64 1.25 1.32
Veneto 1.20 1.04 1.10 0.78 1.44 1.11
Friuli Venezia Giulia 1.09 1.11 1.39 1.25 1.07 1.18
Emilia Romagna 0.98 1.05 1.03 2.63 1.32 1.40
Toscana 0.95 1.04 1.05 1.59 1.30 1.19
Umbria 0.91 1.02 0.97 0.96 1.16 1.00
Marche 0.98 1.05 0.97 0.84 0.88 0.94
Lazio 0.93 1.01 0.97 1.29 0.69 0.98
Abruzzo 0.88 1.03 0.95 0.60 0.89 0.87
Molise 0.84 0.98 0.93 0.23 0.42 0.68
Campania 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.19 0.66 0.74
Puglia 1.06 0.95 0.66 0.24 0.67 0.72
Basilicata 0.85 0.94 0.62 0.67 0.47 0.71
Calabria 0.87 0.93 0.77 0.13 0.63 0.67
Sicilia 0.91 0.95 0.83 0.56 0.58 0.77
Sardegna 0.95 0.95 0.74 0.54 0.59 0.76
ITALIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
North-west 1.06 1.04 1.44 1.04 1.16 1.15
North-east 1.12 1.04 1.26 1.58 1.27 1.25
Centre 0.94 1.03 0.99 1.17 1.01 1.03
South 0.91 0.96 0.81 0.39 0.61 0.74
(1) Regional values are obtained as simple averages of provincial values. - (2) Change in life expectancy. - (3) Invalsi score obtained by 6th and 
9th grade students. - (4) Inverse of average length of trials. - (5) Number of children receiving care per inhabitant. - (6) Average performance computed on two





Table 2. Public sector efficiency indicators (output-oriented DEA)
Region (1) Health  Education Judicial system  Daycare Waste disposal Average
Valle d'Aosta 0.77 0.92 0.30 0.17 0.70 0.57
Piemonte 0.76 0.91 0.43 0.45 0.65 0.64
Liguria 0.74 0.87 0.23 0.44 0.87 0.63
Lombardia 0.87 0.89 0.32 0.38 0.76 0.64
Trentino Alto Adige 0.89 0.84 0.34 0.38 0.63 0.62
Veneto 0.88 0.89 0.24 0.37 0.72 0.62
Friuli Venezia Giulia 0.82 0.95 0.31 0.33 0.70 0.62
Emilia Romagna 0.72 0.92 0.23 0.71 0.87 0.69
Toscana 0.72 0.90 0.23 0.49 0.89 0.65
Umbria 0.69 0.88 0.25 0.50 0.76 0.61
Marche 0.74 0.91 0.21 0.41 0.82 0.62
Lazio 0.69 0.87 0.22 0.52 0.84 0.63
Abruzzo 0.66 0.89 0.21 0.35 0.75 0.57
Molise 0.62 0.84 0.21 0.11 0.56 0.47
Campania 0.70 0.83 0.21 0.27 0.65 0.53
Puglia 0.78 0.82 0.15 0.34 0.78 0.57
Basilicata 0.69 0.81 0.14 0.38 0.58 0.52
Calabria 0.68 0.81 0.17 0.33 0.74 0.55
Sicilia 0.67 0.82 0.18 0.40 0.74 0.56
Sardegna 0.70 0.82 0.16 0.29 0.77 0.55
ITALIA 0.75 0.87 0.24 0.42 0.76 0.59
North-west 0.79 0.90 0.32 0.36 0.75 0.62
North-east 0.83 0.90 0.28 0.45 0.73 0.64
Centre 0.71 0.89 0.23 0.48 0.83 0.63
South 0.69 0.83 0.18 0.31 0.70 0.54











Healthcare Education Judicial system Daycare Waste disposal
Healthcare 1.00 0.19 0.33 0.02 0.01
Education 1.00 0.26 0.21 0.06
Judicial system 1.00 -0.02 -0.07
Daycare 1.00 0.31
Waste disposal 1.00
(1) Measures refer to output efficiency (DEA).





Table 4. Public sector efficiency scores
Region (2) Output efficiency (DEA) Input efficiency (DEA) Linear efficiency (3) Deterministic efficiency 
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank
Valle d'Aosta 0.57 13 0.39 18 0.39 17 0.62 11
Piemonte 0.64 4 0.51 6 0.47 8 0.65 4
Liguria 0.63 5 0.47 10 0.42 12 0.64 6
Lombardia 0.64 3 0.56 2 0.51 1 0.66 3
Trentino Alto Adige 0.62 10 0.46 12 0.41 15 0.63 8
Veneto 0.62 8 0.54 3 0.48 6 0.64 7
Friuli Venezia Giulia 0.62 7 0.50 9 0.48 5 0.65 5
Emilia Romagna 0.69 1 0.62 1 0.50 3 0.66 2
Toscana 0.65 2 0.53 4 0.49 4 0.66 1
Umbria 0.61 11 0.50 7 0.47 7 0.63 10
Marche 0.62 9 0.52 5 0.50 2 0.63 9
Lazio 0.63 6 0.50 8 0.43 10 0.61 12
Abruzzo 0.57 14 0.43 13 0.43 11 0.60 13
Molise 0.47 20 0.38 20 0.38 20 0.52 20
Campania 0.53 18 0.40 16 0.38 18 0.56 18
Puglia 0.57 12 0.47 11 0.47 9 0.58 15
Basilicata 0.52 19 0.40 17 0.40 16 0.55 19
Calabria 0.55 17 0.42 15 0.42 14 0.57 16
Sicilia 0.56 15 0.43 14 0.42 13 0.58 14
Sardegna 0.55 16 0.39 19 0.38 19 0.56 17
ITALIA 0.59 0.49 0.46 0.62
North-west 0.62 0.48 0.45 0.64
North-east 0.64 0.53 0.47 0.64
Centre 0.63 0.51 0.47 0.63
South 0.54 0.41 0.41 0.57
(1) Scores refer to average public sector efficiency. - (2) Regional values are obtained as simple averages of provincial values. - (3) Linear and 




















Output-oriented DEA 1.00 0.91 0.76 0.91 0.68
Input-oriented DEA 1.00 0.85 0.85 0.60
Linear efficiency 1.00 0.83 0.61
Deterministic efficiency 1.00 0.71
Stochastic efficiency 1.00
(1) Measures refer to average public sector efficiency.





Table 6. Interest in politics and morality. 
Region (1) Referendum turnout  Newspapers (2) Intpol  Morality (3)
Valle d'Aosta 85.42 52.64 69.03 34.47
Piemonte 91.41 42.75 67.08 44.52
Liguria 88.75 75.84 82.30 37.70
Lombardia 93.69 57.30 75.49 45.81
Trentino Alto Adige 90.74 83.15 86.94 48.38
Veneto 95.31 50.32 72.81 48.91
Friuli Venezia Giulia 91.87 79.82 85.84 67.32
Emilia Romagna 97.84 61.63 79.74 59.15
Toscana 94.55 54.29 74.42 56.03
Umbria 94.66 36.25 65.45 46.77
Marche 93.18 36.56 64.87 40.62
Lazio 89.20 35.53 62.36 34.47
Abruzzo 82.50 30.79 56.65 38.15
Molise 73.81 16.97 45.39 40.48
Campania 74.79 18.50 46.64 25.31
Puglia 80.24 21.96 51.10 43.63
Basilicata 79.91 15.65 47.78 46.86
Calabria 70.17 21.59 45.88 24.78
Sicilia 75.46 21.12 48.29 39.18
Sardegna 80.50 55.85 68.18 36.58
ITALIA 86.20 43.43 64.81 42.96
North-west 89.82 57.13 73.48 40.63
North-east 93.94 68.73 81.33 55.94
Centre 92.90 40.66 66.78 44.47
South  77.17 25.30 51.24 36.87
(1) Regional values are obtained as simple averages of provincial values. 
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Table 7a. OLS estimation (robust standard errors in parentheses)
Constant 0.800 *** 0.784 ***
(0.076) (0.0781)
Intpol 0.003 *** 0.003 **
(0.001) (0.001)  
Pop 0.002 *** 0.003 ***
(0.001) (0.001)
D_South -0.094 *** -0.091 ***
(0.032) (0.031)
Morality 0.001










Table 7b. OLS estimation by sector (robust standard errors in parentheses)
Education Health Civil Justice Child Care Waste coll.
Constant 0.957 *** 0.787 *** 1.116 *** 0.092 0.779
(0.042) (0.073) (0.290) (0.342) (0.116)
Intpol 0.001 * 0.003 *** 0.000 0.011 ** 0.003 **
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
Pop 0.000 * 0.001 0.001  0.015 *** 0.001  
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
D_South -0.066 *** -0.024 -0.409 *** -0.075  0.000  
(0.018) (0.032) (0.118) (0.135) (0.050)
 
R
2 0.31 0.20 0.17 0.32 0.08
Observations 103 103 103 95 103
PSE
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Constant 0.656 *** 0.634 *** 0.602 *** 0.585 *** 0.369 ** 0.590 ** 0.635 *** 0.634 ***
(0.0873) (0.096) (0.0929) (0.1072) (0.378) (.2599) (0.0754) (0.080)
Intpol  0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 ** 0.005 *** 0.005 ** 0.005 *
(0.0012) (0.001) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0018) (.0018) (0.0019) (0.003)
Pop 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.001)
D_South -0.044  -0.043 -0.040 -0.043 -0.025 -0.043 -0.036 -0.042
  (0.0336)  (0.03)   (0.0031) (0.0326) (0.0387) (0.0339) (0.0333) (0.0321)
Morality 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.001
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0078) (0.0056)
GDP per capita 0.001 0.001
(0.0046) (0.007)
Hansen test (p-value) 0.969 0.979 0.478 0.837 0.386 just identified 0.950 0.795







Instruments: Past political 
participation (2)
Table 8a. Instrumental variables estimation (robust standard errors in parentheses)
Instruments: Political 
history (1)








Table 8b. First stage regressions (robust standard errors in parenthesis)
Repubbliche 0.738 0.396 2.162 3.827
(3.757) (3.8148)  (3.135) (3.259)
Signorie 0.771 0.484   1.674 3.221
(3.959) (3.9211)  (3.369) (2.837)
Pontificio -11.564 *** -11.461 ***   -6.806 ** -1.149  
(3.801) (3.791)  (3.249) (3.110)
DueSicilie -21.258 *** -21.141 ***    -15.112 *** -1.310  
(2.877) (2.896)  (2.822) (2.3701)
 
Election 0.494 ***  0.474 *** 0.313 *** 0.232 ***  
 (0.086)   (0.0841) (0.0823)  (0.0867)
Associations 0.015 * 0.016 * 0.002 -0.010 *
 (0.0087)   (0.009) (0.0062)   (0.006)
Morality 0.089 0.087
(0.0798) (0.0856)
GDP per capita 1.026 *** 1.489 ***
(0.295) (0.302)
R
2 0.75    0.66   0.75 0.67 0.78 0.73 0.17     0.21  
F statistic  72.63 49.42 60.93 39.40 66.04 66.15 3.29 6.11
Observations 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
In the first stage D_south, Pop, and a Constant are always included among the regressors.
Dependent variable: "intpol" Dependent variable: "morality"





Table 9. OLS and quantile regression estimation (robust standard errors in parentheses)
OLS
0.1 0.25 0.75 0.9
Constant 0.471 *** 0.614 *** 0.716 *** 0.845 *** 0.901 ***
(0.089) (0.148)  (0.085) (0.079) (0.188)
Intpol 0.002 * 0.003 * 0.003 ** 0.003 *** 0.003
(0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Pop 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 ** 0.002  0.011 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
D_South -0.032 -0.218 *** -0.081 * -0.080 *** -0.128 *
(0.038) (0.077) (0.047) (0.026) (0.066)
D_Municipality -0.026 -0.226 *** -0.123 *** 0.055 0.163 **
(0.024) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042) (0.069)
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